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S·±de 1, Rec0rded November 28, 1984, page 1-~Edward G. Lansdale 
C: Good afternoon. I am Professor Currey and I am very honored today not 
only to have all of you here, but because of the individual you came to hear 
who is in town as my guest. The individual spent long years in the Philippines 
and I would like for you to meet Mrs. Lansdale, a member of the ... a citizen of 
the Philippines and more recently, the United States,. Our spea,ke'l'.l this, afte'l'.' .;._ 
noon is Major General Edward Gary Lansdale, who has been involved w::i:th America 1' s-
intelligence activities since about 1942. He has led an extraordinary life. 
He became a close friend and confidant of Ramond Magsaysay, the hero of the 
Philippines in the years right after World War II, when Magsaysay was trying 
to bring democracy to that land. General Lansdale was then Lt. Colonel or 
11ajor or ... '? 
L: Lt. Colonel. 
C: Lt. Colonel Lansdale became a very close friend of Magsaysay. The two 
of them for many years were almost like brothers. When he finished his work 
in the Philippines, General Lansdale went to Viet Nam and became an adviser 
to Ngo Dihn Diem, the first President of the Republic of South. Viet Nam 1 a 
position he maintained for some years. And at that point, I would like to 
give you General Lansdale. 
L: Thank you 
APPLAUSE 
L: ••• (illegible) ... like to sit down back there. 
What I thought I 1d do is just talk for a little and then answer any ques-tions ,. 
And since my wife is here as a surprise to me, I have revised ·my talk. Usually 
when T talk about the Philippines or Viet Nam, she says, I have heard it nefore, 
and bored, and she either gets up or tells all of you that you'll get bored, too; 
so I am going to talk about something else and you can ask any questions later 
you want about Viet Nam or the Philippines. I want to talk about South America 
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L: a little. 1 1 11 tell you ... I'll tell you how tne C0mmunist party, got ' 
started down in Venezuela, a few stories, that is, not known ab0ut that by ,ver,y, 
,many people. rt was started by an American from Philadelphia, named ~oseph 
Cornfetter C? ) and he was one of the very early American Ccnnmunists and was 
asked by the Russians to go to the Lenin School in Moscow where revolutionar,±es' 
are trained. And he was in the second class there . One of h±s, cla,ssmate~ 
was Ho Chi Mihn from Viet Nam and many of the other ear-ly Communists, whol5eca,me 
throughout 
leaders a-M"O~M the world later. I had gone through, a period of so many trips, 
out to Asia that the u.s. government was, getting a little worried about ,my,; .• 
what I was doing in these countries and suggested I go some other place . We 
were getting ready to intervene in Viet Nam 7 tliey told me to keep strictly, 
away fr-om Viet Nam and pay no attention to it and (illegible phrase). So I 
picked South America as a good place to visit and at the time they were 
blowing up the oil rigs on Lake Maraciibo ( ) and Cuba was training saboteurs 
to go in and I got in touch with the officials down in Venezuela and the Defense 
Minister asked me to come down and visit. So before going down there I, I did 
-my own type of research very quickly, and checking what Americans had been down 
there to Venezuela before and I discovered Standard Oil and a number of the oil 
companies and D.S. Steel, Sears Roebuck and Company, quite a big American .... 
but one of them was an ex-Communist from Philadelphia, Joseph Cornf;ettev, so 
I invited him down to my office in the Pentagon and started talking to him and 
he told -me the story of how he started the Corrmmnist Party in Venezuela after 
his- training in Moscow. The Russians, you know, wanted a revolution by the 
proletariat, s0 tnei'l'.' organizers were all trained to go down to where their 
factories and indust'!7ial workers, the proletariat had to be city- workers, labor, 
and he had lbeen a labor leader in the D.S. early on so they sent him down to 
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L: Caraca.s·, -Venezuela, t0 organize the proletariat there. Tt was a very-
small proletariat, because there weren't too many workers, there. There and 
in C0lumbia was· the next, country. So he started working away organizing 
lab0r and, and getting close to various people in .the labor movement down 
there, and he had been there a couple of weeks· and they- started getting 
suspicious of some of the people he was meeting and having beer with at 
night and so forth and trying to talk over. And there was a Dictat0,'r, 
Gomez, in Venezuela at the time and he suddenly started discovering that 
all these people that were so nice to him and listening to him, joining in 
with him and everything, were all Secret Police under Gomez, and that hewas 
0n the list to be arrested and not deported, but thrown in jail and the key· 
thrown away So he started getting very worried; he was an American boy 
a long way from home. And he had only one non-Communist person to turn to 
down there. He didn't have any Communists to turn to, he just had these 
secret agents of the Dictator, police, police-types down there, but when he, 
left Philadelphia the family friends of his folks had said, when you are in 
Caracas, our cousin is teaching at the University, Central University down 
there in Cara.cas, and look him up sometime. Maybe you two can have dinner 
together 0r something, and you'll like him, and have a beer or something; he 
is a nice guy. At the moment of desperation, Cornfetter got out and looked 
up this guy who was a professor at the University in Caracas, Central University, 
and told him the story, and the professor said, well, T'm not a Communist. 
I '·m not a. Socialist, I'm nothing, but as a friend of my folks, why, sure, I 1 11 
put you up. So he hid out at this professor's house for abQmt th'ree months, 
and after some weeks of being in seclusion at this guy's· house, the professor 
sta.rted inviting some of his friends over from the faculty at the Uni>versity·, 
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L: and some of them were quite sympathetic to his point of view and thus 
±nstead of getting ... his seed work for the party among the proletariat, he did 
it among the intellectuals in Venezuela in the Unive't'sity, and tlie first 
Communist party was formed there in the professor's house. He di::dn~t join 
himself, the American professor from Philadelphia, but the others from 
the Central University joined together and so .... so it wasn't the. pr0leta:t;"i::an 
revolution at all; it was an intellectual one. And I had noticed that 
elsewhere in South America; I don't think it is quite true in Central 
America. But down in South America the universities are the real haven 
0f the h0tbed of the Communists and rebels and people that are cmt to cause 
trouble. When I went down some years later, Central University had a campus· 
right in the middle of Caracas, a very big city, and in the morning when the 
people were going to work along two of the main streets that bypassed the 
campus·, on the outskirts· of it, the students used to set up machine guns· and 
fire into the traffic, be a real hazard. And they we'l'.'e not trying to snoot 
people except the people that g0 t in the way, they got shot. But they were 
trying to knock out the cars . The main male dormitory· on canipus• was· called 
by the students, Stalingrad, and they went out in the mor.ning and rai.s:ed tfie 
Communist flag up over the University campus. And they· ran the caTl}pus•, The¥ 
completely ran it. And while r was there the students decided to start a, 
revolut;ton in Venezuela, and they had read Mao, Mao Tse Tung, so they• went 
out to do it the way Mao Tse Tung said. Mao said, you g0 to a rem0te place 
and you start your revolution there where it would be safe. S-o these kids· 
were all city kids, mind you, at the University. They- didn 1 t know tne out"' 
do0rs in Venezuela very well, and so they picked the Falcan Hi_lls, CSP.. 7). , 
l l which is a coastal area, and remote en~ugh. There are no people upin there, 
except one farmhouse in that whole region. So they waited until summer vac21,tiGm 
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L: s0 they could start a revolution, out camping, so, boys and girls together, 
they went up to start the revolution . The United Sta,tes military·, among 
others·, were advisi:ng on counter.,...insurge ncy down there so, oh hoy , thi\s is- an 
insurgency all of a sudden . They were advising the Venezuelean Army and Air 
Force how· to go in and put downfue insurgency . So when I got down there to 
look into the bombing of the rigs on Lake Maracaibo and see what was going 
on, r- saw this grand show of military . .. artillery booming away, aircraft 
going over and bombing, and these were empty hills . They looked like Arizona 
and New· :Mexico or parts of southern California , dry hills up there, and when 
I went down to ask . .. is the enemy up there; is he shooting at yoff . or what , 
ycm 1·re firing at them. They hadn ' t seen the enemy at all and, .. 3-man patrol, 
national guard , the national guard down there is the only regular military in 
Venezuela, and they are sort of a combination of military police, state police, 
park service, county agents, and so forth. They are very close. to the people. 
And they were coming down out of the hills and I went over to talk to them, 
and they were looking with great astonishment at this great military display 
out there, and they were sending troops up in the hills and ever ything ~ They 
said, well, the Communists aren't there. They are all over at so- and ~ so,, s 
farmhouse. They got up in there and they camped out overnight and were going 
to start their revolution . .. until their canteens were all empty and they ran 
out of water to drink , nothing to wash their teeth in the morning, no water 
fo!t' coffee or anything, so they had gone to the only place where there was- a 
well in the whole Falca,n Hills C'? ) was this farmhouse and they- were sta,ying 
there and w:h E! re ~they',had been was getting bombed, now they can't g0 bac k there 
and they want to know how to come in . And I said, well , let's go over and tell 
these Generals over here with the ir Arnerica,n adviser s · tha t you will go ·up tlie;l;'e, 
, 
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L: take them up there, and invite the Communists to come on back and go 
back to the University and you arentt going to kill them this- afternoon. So 
they went up and stopped the whole rebellion . Tt was- very ludicrous- to me , 
But the Americans fought in Viet Nam the same way ... at ti'mes on the · tfi:tng. 
But T wasn't permitted to stay in the country very long, but by that time 
I had gotten enough of a lugubrious reputation to be a little bit like Lenin 
and Trotsky in the old days when the Germans let them through to start the 
Russian revolution when they put them on sealed box cars through Germany, 
and they couldn't stick their heads out the windows even or the doors. And 
they used to let me go in countries if I promised not to stay longer ~han 
five days. Our State Department did that to me. And Tasked them, why five 
days:? Well , it seems it takes longer to start a revolution than five days, 
and T couldn't stay longer ... long enough to start a revolution. I said, I've 
never started a revolution in my life, and they thought that I s what I was· 
going to do, I guess. So I .. . I had a vacation from insurgency and guerilla 
warfare and so on in the Far East. But I'm just going to talk a little and 
open it up for any questions, either about that or about Asia or about Viet 
Nam, the Philippines ..• 
Q: On the Philippines. I was kind of interested in your thoughts on what 
position the United States should take vis a vis the Marcos regime in case of 
a pepular uprising by the Filipino people. 
L: Well, first of all , I don't think there is going to be an uprising, 
My- w±fe (illegible phrase). she would come up here and beat me up. We have got 
to be very c areful in how we handle the Filipino people. They are very sensitive 
with their pride. They love the United States and love Americans, but do n 1 t 
want anybody to say that, except themselves, Tf an American says- that, they 
w:ill deny it, and they will have big parades out in front of the Embassy, 
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L: Americans Go Home, and so forth, and then the next day they· wi l l be in 
trying to get exit visas and get visas to the United Sti'J,tes, to c ome over here, 
.•. My wife used to work at the Embassy and watch thes:e parades-, and they we~e 
the same people that leave off the lines trying to get visas to come te, the 
United States, and go out and join the parade, you know, Yankee Go Home, and 
they would carry signs· around and so forth. But this to them is heaven, here 
in the United States, and they would like to get here. They, .. they share tfie 
same ethics that we do, the same principles and dreams that we believe in , 
ideals, including democracy. And they don't have it now·. The Communists· are 
offering one way out. I don't think that t:'.hey will want to go with them at 
all. I don't think they will go, follow them, but it is the only open way· 
to go, other than going along with Marcos, so a lot of the people are uneasy· 
in themselves on what to do next. When something happens the:r;e , I think itts 
going to be when something happens to Marcos himself. Physical ailments o r 
debilitation or something, he will have to sit down and it's going to be 
an "iffy" sequence then. But if the United States steps in to do something, 
we are going to be making mistakes there with the people and we can 1't win •.. 
we 1·d jo;i:n whoever it would be against at that time, shoWc an open enmity·, wnicli 
wouldn •· t be a true one but it would be evident there and it would be wrong so 1 
we have got a very ticklish row to hoe. The Soviets are in there nc,w-. .. they 
have got a lot of military attaches, they have got a got of KGB pe~ple with. 
thei'I'.' Embassy in there. They have learned the local language. They ar:e getting 
all around the country, getting to meet people and go with them, but r don~t 
think they have made that much of a headway with them at all. I think that the; 
loyalties:, the deep-down feeling of the Filipino people, are s ·till towa,rds· the. 
United States and what they have with us. But they are coming up to a ver:y· 
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L: tragic moment when something happens to Marcos. And it's too bad that 
he hasn 1' t prepared his country better for his demise tha,n he has·. He thinks· 
he has- a scheme but I' know that it is good. Yeah? 
Q: I wonder if you phrase) techniques, psychological techniques, 
that were used in counter-insurgency (illegible phrase). 
L: Yeah. Incidentally we called almost everything that we did Psy war in 
those days. And I used to get kidded every place, you know:, you and your 
God damned Psy War they would tell me, you know. But the Communists fought 
using psychological operations as the ... psychological political operations· 
is their main activity and in order to fight them, fight them successfully, 
you had to go back along the same veins to do that. We . . • do anything that 
would force the enemy troops and groups to do certain things, and either ge 
the wrong places or be misdirected and so forth.. One of them was my f r:i;end, 
Colonel Valeriano. I introduced loud hailers from the Navy, beach maste'l'.'s in 
fhe-. ,, World War II, . I got some old surplus ones, had them carry it up in a 
liaison aircraft, and get out and talk with the enemy troops when he was· 
fighting a Huks' squadron and yell at them. We'd get very good intelligence 
on them, so he would go up and yell at them, call several of them by· name 
so he could spot them out in the . . . they'd be running from his troops, and 
calling several of them by name, and said well, the next time you a'l'.'e here, 
we are going to handle it a little different and then Goodbye to our friends 
in the ranks·, I'm sorry I can ' t call you by name. But they would get to a 
rest area, the enemy getting away from his troops and look for his friend i .n 
their ranks and shoot two or three of the Huks there. And he didn't have a 
friend in their ranks, but he had enough. information on them , That was a very 
11 
live ... of doing ... ;I:; 1J:?emef9b.e;q ;i:,n the elect.ions, of 1,51_ , w.e. got . tne . A,mny· in to ' 
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L: pretect the elections and bring the people and government cl0ser together , 
And the Conrrnunists· had a mov ement before. that in the previous· elections· o 
boycotting them, and some of the intelligence , Filipino intelligence people, 
found an 
agitprop cell of the Conrrnunists in the Manila area, and let me know aoout. · ±t. 
And we introduced Boycott the Elections propaganda into them in leaflets-, 
which they started distributing and the Politburo bawled this· agitprop cell 
out for doing something not authorized. But meanwhile they had all adopted 
it, it had been a familiar slogan from two years before, so they all went in 
and adopted it: Boycott the Elections because it would be dishonest, well, 
we ·made a very honest election. The people recognized its honesty , and the 
people against the administration all won in the election, and it became very 
0fo.rious that the Communists had been wrong in wanting to boycott it, So then 
we said, well, get your leaders on your side. So that pride about the elections· 
and so forth, they must be the same way about what they want you to do in the 
future and so forth. Do you still trust them? Well, a lot didntt and we had 
gotten a lot of. people over to join our side because of it. We did a lot of 
things like that. we ... I think the biggest thing wasn•t propa ganda as such, 
but we started a program to get land to the landless over there, which is· a 
big Communist slogan, at the time. Many of the Communist recruits and so forth 
were farm kids whose parents had been in debt and paying off on family debts 
and were tenant farmers, and they were paying off debts that their fathers· had , 
so it was about two or three generations bac k that usury and so forth, and 
paying off debts. And when the Communists said, we are going to , .. everyone 
of you is going to get some land of your own if you join us; in the beginning 
was a very popular thing to do. we got some land down in Mindanao and took. 
pe0ple retiring from the Army and got the prisoners who looked all right to us, 
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L: sent them down to Mindinao, along with the Army retirees, and we started 
s0me agricultural settlements down there. And they . • . I remember the first 
group of prisoners we took down there. One of them was a. young guy and we 
had everybody aboard an LST going down to Mindinao, and I was watching tn±s-
young Communist prisoner going around talking secretly to an awful · l0t of 
people aboard this LST, and it looked to me as though he was organizing 
something. I told the Secretary of Defense, Magsaysay, I said, T think we''re 
making a mistake just taking this rebellion, Luzon where they ha.ve been 
fighting, down to Mindinao now and this guy is going to make future tr©uhle 
for us down there. So he went and talked to him and he said, yeah , he is, 
trying to line up a little bit of hard core down there. And we got down to 
Mindinac, and this is like California is to us here, is to Florida Cillegiblel 
But when we got down there, the trees, fruit trees, fruit was ten times as, 
big as anybody had ever seen up in Luzon. The fish and everythj:ng were. big ~ 
And everybody's· expression, you know, this big and what have you , t0 sh©w 
how- big everything was. And this guy who started, and worried us·, prisone:l'.' 1 
finally told him we were going to take him back to Luzon and he couldnl>t 
s·tay cm there and .•. a place for him. He looked at this and there is a little 
band of local people on the landing strip that we pulled up to in the LST ~ 
They had a 3- piece band out there playing Welcome to Mindinao to us,, and we 
got down ..• and this guy came up and he had tears in his eyes and he. begged 
Mags·aysay to please, couldn't he stay there. He didn ~t know that i _t was for 
real .•. and he said well, Magsaysay said well, take him along with us. we 
went in to where they were going to colonize in the jungle there , clea,;r a 
jungle out and he was looking at the trees· a,nd everything. He stayed on and 
finally begged Magsaysay so much to stay on we left him the!r,e, · Nt,:,rd q;f tli:gs: 
STDE 2 
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L: thing that we were. doing spread all over Asia . I' was· su;i:;pri:sed at how· 
far it went. And the British d0wn in Mai:asia ,.were having trouble apparently 
with their problems there, the Communists and the people in Malasia working 
with the British and either helping them or fighting against them were all 
talking about what we were doing. We called--(illegible} the Headquarters 
and the Headquarter was the wonderful place we had. we had a generator., . 
... and one of the persons that came over was a New York Times correspondent 
and he said, well, I'd like to talk to somebody that was a real dyed in the 
wool Huk1down :_-ibhere. All I see are happy, smiling people and half of them 
are Army and half of them o..ta:im they're former Huks. I'd like a real die-
hard Huk to talk to. So I said, well, here's one of them. I introduced him 
to this guy that we'd had real doubts about having him stay there, and he 
talked to him. And I left them alone and went on and finally this New York 
Times correspondent came over and saw me and started cussing me under his· 
breatfL, and I said, what's the trouble? He said, well, that guy is· one of 
your propaganda agents. And I said ... he was a Communist, why he fought real 
hard up in Central Luzon area. And he said the way he talked to me, he was: 
raving about this place and asked me to please write it up and so forth, 
Well, I''m sorr-y, but he was a real hard core Communist, and he. changed 
completely. So with that, I said to Magsaysay, let's try him out. Let's 
send him back home and talk to the folks at home, to Central Luzon where he 
was from. So he went up then and talked in his home barrio to his uncles, 
and then went up to where all the Huks were recruiting from and so on a,nd 
( q 
telling them about this headquarter down there and he was telling stories 1 you 
know, a,bout everyth;i:ng was this big and this big and so on. It was like. some 
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L: guy selling real estate in, I'll say California, and rea,lly amused me, 
But ..• (illegible) he brought his mother down and his s·ister, and the fi:l?st 
time in his family's history, he is out of debt and hets paid off,. . and he 
owns· his own place now. And the new peoples' army is trying to rec ;t;"uit 
down there and isn't getting any recruits in that area at all a,nd wQnt..t 
have anything to do with them. I believe you ha,d a question, t0O, 
Q: I was going to change the scene a little bit; add a, mucfr. more tcmgli 
political question. You were the acknowledged exper,t on South Viet Nam 
during the Eisenhower administration,., .discussed by ProfessoF Cur;i;'e~('l,s , 
introduction; something happened when Kennedy took office, · I d~nlt kn(')W1 
I don•·t understand what it was, I wonder if you would explain it te, us·. 
Acco't'ding to (illegible) when Taylor was sent, General Taylo't' was- sent t<;?l 
South Viet Nam to do an appraisal of what would be needed there , you went 
along as· part of the mission. There was a power play of some ki.nd Cilleg:j_':bleL 
wherein you were assigned some as:i:m.irie ~objective, defense feasibility study, 
r don't know, for building a ... wire around Viet Nam or something to stop the 
insurgent.. ,to stop infiltration and this didn't sit very well with you 
for obvious reasons. It appears to me that somebody had it in for you, 
p;robably,.,is that because of you:i:; background in the Eisenhower administration 
O't' what, and as near as I can tell, once again from my limited access through 
David Elderspan (sp.?) and other miscellaneous sources, from ... during the 
Kennedy admi nistration you were essentially cut out of effective policy input. 
L: That is correct, 
Q. What happened? 
L: I don't know. I don't know. I should know, and I don't. I had just 
c0me back from Viet Nam, a visit there, at the end of the E.;i:s:enhower administration, 
Side :'2 , Recorded November 28, 1984, page 13---Edwa,rd G. Lansdale 
L: a n d I got back to Washington a week before the inauguration of Kennedy, 
And he was· inaugurated and then that first weekend after he was inaugurated , 
McNamara was the new Defense Secretary. He called me at home on Saturday 
morning and asked me to get down to the White House immediately where he 
was. And I went down·, there was a meeting there, and they-•.• Kennedy had ·-my 
report in front of him, and he was ... it was in the .. ,I think it was in 
the Cabinet Room ..• but he had a strange assortment of Cabinet and Assistants, 
about 20 or 30 people, and one of them was the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. · 
And Kennedy said he had read my report on Viet Nam, and he said, what d0 you 
think of going over there as Ambassador? No, he said, did Dean tell you, 
did Dean Rusk tell you that I'd like you to go over there as the Ambassador'? 
No, he didn't, which he hadn't, hadn't mentioned at all. And then I thought, 
my gosh, the guy is asking me to go over as ... well, thank you very much, 
finally, I stumbled, and I said, I'm a regular military officer and T dontt 
think my place is in diplomacy. And that was .. later I was in Bolivia, talking 
to the 
i 
Charge of the U.S. mission there, of the Embassy, and he had 
been Dean Rusk's Assistant at that time, up in Washinqton. And he said, let 
·me tell you what happened after you left the White House, He said Dean Rusk 
told the new President that he woulLd resign as Secretary of State if Twas 
appointed to go over as Ambassador. And I said, why? He said, well, we don 1 t 
want you military types taking over and running our foreign affairs, And T 
said, well, I had no intention (illegible phrase) 
and I agree. with you, I don't want that either. Evidently it caused a niq 
fuss· that I had no idea of doing that. And right after that thev set up a 
tas-k fcrce on Viet Nam in Washinqton and McNamara, who has got a bigger eqo 
than any of us, and many- of us have very __ <h{g _qnes, he had a bigger one, he 
/ 
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L: came over from a meetinq with Kennedy two days later and said, they 
cut 0ut the National Operations Board which (.illegible} and we 1 re so'l? t of 
stuck now on how to get the different departments together on foreign policy-
and come to some quick decisions among themselves, and I promised Kennedy-
that T would show up at the next White House meeting a,nd give him tne answer 
to :i_t, A,nd he had two of us in there, and he said, T want you t<5 come up · 
in the next couple of days with the answer to what I tell the President, 
and so he could go back and boast to him , what a great idea he had , The 
., 
other guy was reorga,nizing the military in the Pentagon. He said, Bos-8'; y0u 
have got me snowed under with work now. I said I'll come up witli. an idea 
so we can both give it to him. I came up with the idea of a tc:1sk_ force, 
that would do it. So Kennedy took the idea and he set up his first one 
for Viet Nam . He asked the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gilpatrick, to 
Officer '! 
chair it, as- long as I would be the Executive J and make it work. Well,, 
we held meetings at the Pentagon and we had all the bras-sin from Sta,te and 
other agencies and departments and Gilpatrick told me, said, I dontt think, 
we are under such serious pressures here; you go in and chair the meeting , 
I said , no, you are the chairman; you do it, No, y0u go. I said 1 look the:se 
guy-s are just waiting for a big fight with_me , T feel it in my bones, So!' 
went in and all the soeeches from the State Department officia,ls, what a 
big bum I waS:; it started that way, not on Viet Nam at all but why I 
shouldn' t oym±xed up in it, So the second, third meeting, when I couldn 11t 
get G:j:lpatrick in, I started off the meeting, I said, now- I 1m going to 
give each_ of you two minutes rebuttal on the thing; I'm going to tell you 
in the beginning what I think of you . I have refrained frqm that up to now. 
So T tc:ild them. A,nd I said, now, each of you have got two minutes to sa,y what 
/ 
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L: you want to say and then we' 11 get on with the main fmsines•s here and 
cut out all of this foolishness. Well, those things: don't go in oig conferences, 
and I made some enemies· there. They would say the craziest things·, making 
up policy. One of them was ambassadorial rank, a very good friend of mine, 
got up and he was trying to be appointed Ambassador over in Viet Nam, He 
was· Ambassador closeby there. He got up and said, I think we should ha,ve a 
two-wheel, we are going to have a two-wheel foreign policy, a_nd I s-q,id, you 
mean one bicycle with two wheels? ... or two bicycles with one wheel? And n.e · 
said, no, don't be foolish now, we ought to have a two~wheel policy, I s·till 
don•· t know what that means, but. ... imagine these are grown-up Americans.-
deciding the future of the country, what we fought a war about , and these are 
serious discussions. J:  couldn \·t even understand i _t , S:o J.' sa,i.d, please get 
-me out ef this and fortunately they did, Then when r.,,we m0ved all e;,-ver the 
. , ,State was· screaming so at Defense that we moved it all over to State, 
But I discovered then that I was scheminq and taking over all of the State 
Department functions over in Defense in the Pentagon , which. I never did, but, 
imagine people thinking that. But I was just trying, arguing for common 
sense and everything ... but some feel that the people., .receiving end of our 
efforts ... and I felt very much for the Vietnamese people, then and now, so 
much so that my wife in the Philippines said that the Vietnamese aren't 
worth it, your worrying about them all the time, but I feel that way, and I 
feel the same way about the Filipinos. And I think that you students parti.-. 
cularly, and I know that you are interested in foreign policy and foreign 
affairs and some in the military service and so on, when you get to a foreign 
country, which you will, start working .. ,people there expect something f!t'om 
Amer-icans; the current attitudes will never show it. They might be ver y 
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L: anit.-American in their mobs and demonstrations and eve'.t'ything, deep 
within them they have another view of the United States and of A;mericans 
it means something to them. It's not something (illegible). So when ye:m · 
sta't't work and the closer ye:m come to ideals that we have·T±n the United 
States , the things that we really believe in , and your work, translate 
that into what you are saying to them and your own behavior it~s just 
a;mazing what happens next with them . Yem start speaking a universal 
language to them and you become very close to them and I have become like 
brothers and sisters with many people around the world simply· because as 
they have later confessed to me, you acted as· though we always thought 
Americans should. And .• . . a lot of American militar-y there and so fo'l'.'th., 
but when you stand up for something and the going gets tough and you still 
stand up for these things, it rings out loud and clear and it 1· s the 
strongest ·moral force that argument and psychological forces an individual 
could have. So, let me pass that along to you as something t o hang on:,:- to 
and remember at a time of need in the future . Anybody else have a question; 
Q •.. . Do you believe that, in your opinion , are there a lot of (illegible) 
similarities between the situation in Viet Nam and the current situation in 
Centr3:J.America and (illegible). . Do you think, as you were saying before, 
that the Communists or any of these parties, their major aim is psycholegical 
and political; that we are kind of over--emphasizing the military solution 
to this and we are de-emphasizing the psychological and :9olitical aspects 
of the, in the conflict? 
L: Most of our solutions, we send observers from the Pentagon and the State 
Department to go down and look at a situation, and sometimes a person will, 
fr,0m his 0wn staff ; send people to look. In turn, they go in with professional 
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L: views of Americans on the scene and again get in with. the foreign ser-
vices- and the military services. And apparently· we didn"-t learn enough by 
what we went through. Quite a few of us· caught on in Viet Nam. I, r was-
surprised ·myself eventually to find people who really knew what was happening 
and why· it was happening and so forth.. But the predominant forces that w1;,,rk 
" in the cemntry, policy-wise and something, apparently never did catch on, 
try to be ..•.. for us·. So I hope at some point we would start tlfrnking tha,t 
these are essentially political movements, aimed toward political g0a,ls-, 
They use psyc ••. psychological means to help them towa,ir-ds~ that and military 
' I 
again as a help towards that. When you go in just military against it , you 
can never win it, unless you kill everything in sight. The Com,muni·sts-
themselves in fighting their guerillas and insurgents· leave a. scorcrred earth 
behind them. The Chinese, for example, up ••. when they went against Tibet, 
they ... they told the people in the country to come int~ register at the 
town by such and such a thing, gave them a deadline and when the people •. • 
when that dealine passed, they ... the troops went out in the countryside 
and just shot everything that was moving, men and animals . The Soviets- do 
the same thing.But you have got to move your own people in to fill the va,ca,nt 
spots , and we, we can't fight that way, and we shouldnl•t. we should see . 
it as a political move and see what forces we can bring, including psycholog:j_~ca,l 
and political forces and moral, and what military fo'l'.'ce would be understood 
,, 
by the people there and accepted by us. I remember the first time in Viet Nam, 
I saw artillery being used by the Vietnamese against the enemy vi'.llages-r in 
1960, December 1960, at the end of the Eisenhowe't' administration ~· and r got ' so 
mad '.I: jumped out 0f the car, . ,a Vietnamese Gener-al that I· knew·, it was nis- outf;i-t 
•j 
the't'e and they were sh0oting over the village, and T got him to ceq,se fire,, and 
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L: demanded an explanation of it. My friend there was frc,m the staff of 
Ngo Dinh Diem, the President, and he was trying to calm me dovm, He said, 
you werenit supposed to cc:,me out and give orders like that. I said, ycm 
should; give them orders to stop. You don't do that against y0ur own people. 
And the Americans did the same thing, Koreans-, •. and the :Ko:l'.'eans did tfie sa;me 
. at people . . 
thing. Stand off with artillery and shoot:/ . And I was try-Ing t® expla,In . · 
to them, the Communists use, that's a psychol(')gical judo there, .. using. 
They 1·11 go into the village and teach the pe0ple to use slit trenches- outside 
thier homes or under their beds, so when the aircra;f:t or artillery come in, 
everybody can get in a slit trench and have some chance of luck, · Well, · 
after they have trained the people over that, they 90 con ciut and slioot ·a.n 
Army convoy with rifles and so on and get the troops mad enou<?fh tfiey bring 
up the artillery and shell this hostile village. Well, thevi1lage't's are 
standing there with their mouths open, you know, looking at these foreigners·, 
the guerillas: hidden among them, doing that. And the Communists· turn around, 
get in your slit trenches, you know, we are going to save you. Well, they· 
only save the guys that they got in 
there, that wouldn't havh appened. 
trouble, see, and if they hadn 1t been 
But we oblige and fire back and I said 
that the enemy was getting us to use jujitsu, as I said at the time, · but 
it was our own efforts turning the people against us, If we had sent infantry 
in and braved a little fire, and went in after them to protect the people 
and done it a,s.· a conscious . , . and protectors it would h,;i,ve been a very· 
different result. But we'd done it enough in Viet Nam so by 1965 when we 
sent trQops, in we had a lot of hostile areas that we should never have had 
and a lot of it was- done with American, hecause•w,e didn 1' t know·, When you · a:r;e 
shot i3,t 1 y9u shoot back. , •• well 1 that's a good rule, but you s:ho<l!t back 
at the guy shooting at you, not the innocent people standing next~ t~ him , 
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L: but we didn 11 t seem to catch on to that at all. And I went back to Viet 
Nam later on, after I had gotten out of the military and retired, a,nd I went 
f>ack as m imirlis,ter ',:-rnoitr like you were a minister, but a minister in the 
Foreign S'ervice helping save things and I spent some years in Saigon trying 
to help on these and similar matters·. And I go over and have breakfast with_ 
Westmoreland and beg him to stop some of the things a,nd he would tell me, 
you are not a general, forget that, I won't let you be one 
Unidentified Voice: •.. that could be a pain in the light of the situation on 
the gr nd. I don't think we could obtain much more, but I must say that very 
honestly, did not have much optimism that South Viet Nam was going to •• , 
Second Unidenti 'ed Voice: I have developed trouble in the pull back, and 
we are in a little ooded patch and the son of a bitches just ripped the 
trees apart, you kno~ and no way you could ... it was just trees, it was 
\ 
\ 
roots all over the place.'~ r kept (illegible) alive (illegible)., .the s-econd 
year in a row I .... So we w~e driven out of there and then the next day 
\ 
we went out there (another voic~ Good to see you.) I ran a charge 0n 
', 
that box and pulled the charge and'it blew, and very rarely when you blew 
' 
the box they were a1-reae1.y come out, tna stopped all fire but these bastards (or were readv to c~~ut?) 
kept coming back and (illegible--lot of ba k round noise} so they had a 
\ 
(illegible) go up. Muscatel, do you remember t,hat, there was a tank that 
\ 
went up and he just almost, he was just starting t \ dig into the dirt, a,nd 
the guy c0mes- running out of the hole, out 0f the. nia* ,~ nd he throws• s~me"' 
thing on the tank and it burst into flame. Now I' am te;i'i ±ed of ·mo'l'.' tars, or 
artillery fire, I really., . • r got ,,,r wasn't worried about th fire, were 
